We document that when employees of large US …rms can invest in stocks and earn risk-free pro…ts by participating in employee employee stock purchase plans, over 70% of people fail to take advantage of this opportunity. An average employee who does not sign up for the plan forfeits more than $4,600 per annum. Using survey data on individual employees, we …nd that non-participation is more likely among people who earn lower wages, are less educated, and make fundamental errors in valuation of …nancial securities. Further, employees who fail to earn risk-free pro…ts are less likely to participate in pension plans and the equity market in general. Our results have implications for the equity market non-participation puzzle and suggest that individuals do not always make the best …nancial choices.
Are individuals good at making optimal investment choices? This question has been hotly debated in a number of di¤erent contexts, such as participation in equity market and saving for retirement (see e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) , Haliassos and Bertaut (2005) , and Benartzi and Thaler (2007) ). However, it is generally di¢ cult to …nd de…nitive evidence of suboptimal behavior in these contexts since a wide variety of unobserved factors (e.g., individual risk aversion) can determine the optimal choices of individuals. In this paper, we consider a unique and simple setting provided by Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) and empirically analyze one of the central predictions of …nance theory -whether individuals always take up an investment opportunity with large positive pro…ts and zero risk.
Although a large economic literature is now devoted to studying investments by employees through 401(k) plans (e.g., Benartzi (2001) , Cohen (2009 ), Choi et al. (2011 ), little is known about employee stock purchase plans that are almost as equally common. In essence, ESPPs are company-run programs that allow participating employees to buy company stock at a discount. The typical explicit discount is set at the 15% of the stock price, but the actual value provided by these plans is often higher because of a look-back feature, i.e., the option to buy stock at the lower of the prices at two points of time. What is perhaps the most interesting feature of such plans is that in most cases employees are allowed to sell the stock immediately following the purchase. This contractual feature gives employees a choice not to take any risk on this investment. 1 Despite the obvious attractiveness of ESPPs, we …nd that most employees fail to take advantage of this money-making opportunity. In our sample of large publicly traded U.S. …rms, the average participation rate is below 30%. Moreover, an employee who does not sign up for the plan leaves a considerable amount of money on the table, foregoing on average more than $4,600 each year. To further assess the magnitude of this economic phenomenon, we aggregate employee losses due to non-participation for all …rms in our sample and …nd that they sum to over $10.5 billion.
We then go on to analyze a variety of factors that could drive non-participation. We …nd that participation in ESPP tends to be higher in …rms where employees earn higher salaries, exercise more stock options, and hold more bachelor degrees, which could be taken as evidence of less binding liquidity constraints or better …nancial education.
However, even for …rms with highly paid employees, the average participation rate is far below 100%. For example, the average participation rate among the …rms with average annual salary over $100,000 is 38.1%, whereas it is 6.9% for …rms paying salary below $50,000. We also …nd that factors likely correlated with employee loyalty towards the …rm appear to be important for participation, such as employee approval ratings of …rm's CEO, analyst coverage, and employee job satisfaction.
In addition to using the aggregate annual …rm-level participation data, we also analyze individual data from a detailed survey of employees at four companies with contained 80-100 questions about various stock ownership programs and were administered at 323 di¤erent work sites (see Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010) for a detailed description). The main bene…t of this data set is that it has a wealth of information about individual employees, including their demographic characteristics, salaries, household wealth, investments in the general equity market, stock option grants received, and investments in 401(k). A disadvantage of these data, however, is that they only provide information on whether an employee ever participated in company ESPP, and thus cannot be used to infer whether employees participate currently or contribute up to the maximum allowed limit. In all four …rms, employees are allowed to sell the stock immediately after the purchase through ESPP. De…ning participation rate based on whether an employee ever participated in ESPP, we …nd that average participation rate in this sample is still only 58%. Similar to the other sample, we …nd that employees who report lower salaries and lower household wealth are more likely not to sign up for the ESPP. Non-participation is also particularly common among people who incorrectly value …nancial securities, people of very old age, as well as individuals prone to procrastination, as measured by their lack of participation in national elections.
Our results on low participation in ESPP plans have implications for the large literature that attempts to answer why a substantial fraction of households do not participate in equity markets (see, e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) , Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2005) , Campbell (2006) , Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) , among others).
Given that a similar set of factors may be driving decisions to participate in ESPP and invest in a general stock market, with an important di¤erence that ESPP investment is riskless, our setting allows to examine an interesting question -what factors would matter for equity market participation, if the risk-return-tradeo¤ aspects were removed?
2 This question is of particular importance because non-participation can have direct implications for the equity risk premium in the economy and the equilibrium interest rate (Basak and Cuoco (1998) ).
We …nd some evidence for each of the following factors contributing to non-participation in our context: binding liquidity constraints of employees, non-familiarity in dealing with stock, …nancial illiteracy, unawareness of the signi…cant bene…ts to participation, lack of trust to the company, lack of loyalty, past individual experiences in the stock market, and religious attitudes toward gambling. Among these, the most economically important e¤ects seem to be coming from …nancial illiteracy and non-familiarity in dealing with stock. For example, employees who grossly overvalue or undervalue 2 Several non risk-based explanations to the low stock market participation have been o¤ered, including the large …xed costs associated with participation, lack of trust, unawareness, lack of familiarity, and …nancial illiteracy (see, among others, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) , Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) , Brown et al. (2008) , and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) , Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011), Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) ). However, whether these factors apply to settings when the investment has no risk is not immediately clear. For example, it is conceivable that lack of trust or past stock market experience is relevant only in conjunction with having to take on some risk, but not otherwise.
their out-of-the-money stock options show a 6.76% lower propensity to sign up for the plan and employees without a college degree are 3.4% less likely to participate in ESPP.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section I describes our data sources and presents summary statistics on ESPP plan characteristics. Section II discusses the non-participation rates in ESPP and quanti…es losses of individuals. Section III explores the determinants of failing to participate at both the …rm and individual levels. Section IV investigates the decision not to sell the stock following the purchase.
Section V concludes with a brief summary.
I. Data and Summary Statistics A. Firm Level Data
We hand collect …rm level data on employee stock purchase plans from 10-K forms for all …rms in the S&P 500 index, NASDAQ 100 index, and the S&P 400 midcap index over the …scal years from 1998 through 2007. If the company has an ESPP, we also obtain a detailed ESPP contract; such contracts are typically located in the past SEC …lings. We restrict attention to tax-quali…ed plans since they are open to all employees (with exception of executives owning more than 5% of …rm's stock).
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Our data set has information on the percentage of compensation that employees are allowed to contribute to ESPP, the maximum number of shares that can be purchased each year, the number and price of shares issued through a plan during a …scal year, the length of the o¤ering period, whether the plan has a lookback or reset option, the discount at which shares can be bought, and the length of the period during which employees can not dispose of the acquired shares (if any).
The contract features of stock purchase plans are given in Table I , Panel A. On average, the plan has been adopted by the …rm's shareholders more than 8 years ago, and allows for contributions not exceeding the lower of $25,000 per year or a speci…ed percentage of annual salary, commonly 10%, 15%, or 20%. Some of the plans put additional restrictions on the number of shares that can be purchased by employees during the year, or specify a lower dollar limit than $25,000. Taking into account these restrictions on participation, the average maximum allowed contribution comes out to $11,834 per annum. Over 91% of plans allow to withdraw the contributed funds from the plan up to the date of the actual purchase. Additionally, some plans allow to decrease or increase the contribution rate during the o¤ering period (61.4% and 43.3%, respectively). Over 85% of the plans that specify how the transaction costs are handled, indicate that the company creates brokerage accounts for employees and pays all expenses associated with account maintenance and stock purchases. However, in most cases employees are responsible for the brokerage fees and stamp duties associated with stock sales.
The average discount stipulated by the plan is 13.96%, with most plans having a 15% discount o¤ the market price. 4 Approximately 79.4% of ESPPs have a lookback feature, that allows employees to purchase stock at the discounted price based on the lower of prices at the beginning and the end of the purchase period. The average purchase period is 6 months in our sample, and the average value of the lookback option (when there is one) is 15.7% of the stock price. On the top of that, 8.1% of plans have a reset option that allows to reset the purchase price to the price in the beginning of the previous purchase period, provided that price was lower than the price at the beginning of the current purchase period. The value of the reset option (when present) is 5.9% of the purchase price on average. Overall, participation in ESPP provides an average expected discount of 26.6%, which is equivalent to return on investment of 36.2% over the purchase period. Surprisingly, only 19.5% of taxquali…ed ESPPs require employees to hold stock following the purchase for any period of time. In …rms that do not allow immediate disposition, the minimum holding period ranges from 1 month to 3 years, with the average of 13 months.
Since the maximum contribution to an ESPP is often set as a percentage of an employee's annual compensation, we also need to collect employee salary data, which we obtain from the website Glassdoor.com. These data are anonymously reported by …rm employees (segregated by the job title in each …rm) and cover most of …rms in our sample. A disadvantage of these data is that the average number of respondents per …rm is only 286 people, and we have a single cross section of salaries. As an alternative,
we also obtain salary data from the Compustat "sta¤ expense"item that has been used in the prior literature as a proxy for employee salaries (e.g., Hanka (1998)). However, these data often include non-salary items, such as expenses associated with pension plans, and are available only for a small part of our sample (less than 15%). To calculate the average employee salary for the rest of the …rms, we use the median value of the sta¤ expense item within industry (de…ned by two-digit SIC code) for that year. When sta¤ expense item is non-missing for the …rm, the correlation between
Compustat salary and the survey salary is 69.2% in our sample and the survey salary has a lower mean, consistent with Compustat data overestimating the annual salary.
However when we use the industry median values for the sta¤ expense item, the correlation between the two proxies drops to 20.6%. Overall, we believe that survey salary is a more accurate measure and use the Compustat salary only for robustness checks (the correlation between the two measures of participation is 87.6%). We also obtain data on employee stock option grants and exercises for …rms in our sample, which are available through the RiskMetrics database.
Panel B of Table I shows that the average annual salary that employees receive is $75,729, whereas it is $59,235 for imputed Compustat wage. Employees also receive grants of stock options with an average Black-Scholes value of $24,347 and realize an average value of $20,530 from option exercises each year. Most of the employees approve of a …rm's CEO (Glassdoor.com), with the average approval rate of 60.8%.
As reported by employees, the average satisfaction with their job is 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. Panel B also shows that in 7.3 % of …rm-years, the …rms in our sample make the list of 100 best companies to work for, which is maintained by the Fortune magazine and the Great Place to Work Institute.
Following Cohen (2009) and Benartzi (2001), we collect the data on 401(k) contributions from the annual 11-K …lings. To minimize data collection, we only obtain these data for …rms that have ESPP. We omit 11-k forms …led for employee stock ownership plans and focus on the largest pension plan during the year in …rms with multiple plans. As pointed out by Benartzi (2001), not all 401(k) plans are required to …le the annual reports. Speci…cally, the plans that buy shares on the open market (instead of issuing them) are exempt from this requirement and are thus not represented in our sample. Benartzi estimates that approximately a third of all 401(k) plans fall in this category.
As can be seen from Table I , approximately 42:6% percent of …rms with ESPPs also have a 401(k) plan (…led through 11-K). The average company match is 69:3% and it applies to the contributions of the …rst 5:4% of salary on average. We calculate the employee 401(k) under-participation amount as the percentage of salary to which the match applies minus the combined employee contributions during the year divided by the number of employees and the average survey salary. We set under-participation to zero whenever this variable is less than zero. The average under-participation amount for …rms in our sample is 2:2% of the salary, implying that a large number of employees (at least 40%) do not take the bene…t of a full company match. Note also that we tend to underestimate the under-participation since we use the average per employee values, while many employees contribute to 401(k) a greater percentage of salary than the percentage to which company match applies.
B. Individual Level Data
Our second data set on ESPPs comes from the survey of employees at fourteen com- would pay on average $38.3 for a risky bet that wins $1,000 with probability 10% and nothing with probability 90%, whereas employees at company C would only give $20
for such a bet.
II. ESPP Non-Participation and Employee Losses
Having established that stock purchase plans provide on average a 36.2% return on investment over the purchase period of 6 months, we next turn to the question of participation in these plans by employees. We de…ne two measures of ESPP nonparticipation. The …rst is equal to 100% minus the contributions to ESPP per employee normalized by the minimum of (1) the percent of compensation multiplied by the survey salary, (2) the maximum number of shares that can be purchased multiplied by the beginning-of-year price, and (3) the annual dollar limit. The second measure is similar, but uses the Compustat "sta¤ expense" item instead of survey salary, with the median industry values at the two-digit SIC code being used whenever this item is missing for the …rm. Since we use the average salary at the …rm level, rather than each individual employee salary to calculate the participation rate, it is possible that the participation rate can be biased. However, the Appendix shows that the participation rate is likely to be overestimated by our procedure if the individual participation in ESPP is positively correlated with the individual's salary. We will show later in the paper that this correlation is indeed positive in the data.
We start by reporting the average non-participation rate across all …rms in our sample (Table III) . It turns out that the average non-participation rate is 81.9% in the full sample when we use survey salary and 73.6% when we use Compustat salary.
Although, the non-participation rates are amazingly high, it is possible that they are driven mostly by …rms that require employees to hold the company stock subsequent to the purchase. Despite a good return on investment, it is plausible that lack of diversi…cation and a high correlation between employee human capital and company stock performance may make the participation in ESPP suboptimal. Hence, we next focus only on …rms that allow immediate disposition of the stock subsequent to the purchase (Panels B through D). In this setting, not participating in ESPP is equivalent to leaving money on the table since investment is both riskless and pro…table. Panel B shows that non-participation in ESPP is still very high, with 80.4% and 70.3% nonparticipation rates, on average. Thus a majority of employees do not take advantage of this money-making opportunity.
We next calculate how much money employees forfeit by not signing up for the plan. When the maximum allowed dollar contribution is C, employees can buy the number of shares equal to C=Discounted Price, and earn on each purchased share the spread between the current market price and the discounted price. Thus if the combined expected discount is D, the discounted price is equal to 1 D multiplied by the market price, and the average annual loss is To better assess the employee real losses, we also provide estimates on the after-tax basis. Speci…cally, we calculate the tax liability of employee assuming she sells all the shares immediately and thus there is no capital gain or loss. In this case, all the pro…t from the ESPP purchase and same-day sale is taxed at the ordinary income tax rates.
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We assume the individual tax rate of 28%, which is applicable to employees with the combined annual income of more than $69,000 and less than $144,000 (as of year 2003). Using this tax rate, we estimate the average after-tax forfeited gain from nonparticipation as $3,331 per year. Additionally, even if we assume (counterfactually) that all employees are subject to the highest possible marginal tax rate of 35%, we still obtain large after-tax forfeited gains from non-participation, averaging $3,100 per year.
To see whether there is signi…cant variation in non-participation rates across …rms, we further split the sample into …rms with well-paid and low paid employees. Since our sample consists of large public …rms, employees are likely to earn salaries higher than the national average, so we use the cuto¤s of $50,000 and $100,000. Panel C shows that in …rms with average salary less than $50,000 per year, the non-participation rates are remarkably high at 93.1% or 92.3%, depending on the measure. However, since the salary is low in this sample and the contributions to ESPP are capped by a percentage of salary, the losses per non-participant are relatively small in this sample at $1,640. For …rms where employees make more than $100,000 on average, the non-participation rates are considerably lower at 62.9% and 39.9%, depending on the measure. Conditional on non-participation in the plan, however, the employees in these …rms leave large amounts of money on the table, with an average loss due to non-participation per employee of $8,982 . Since the companies with high salaries also tend to have more generous ESPP plans, with more likely presence of the lookback options, the losses of employees also tend to be larger as a percentage of salary, with an average of 8.41%.
Since the …rm-level analysis uses the average salary and because of that imprecisely estimates the average participation rate, we also use the individual employee data at four public …rms. The advantage of the individual data is that we have accurate estimates of individual's salary, wealth, stock options grants, participation in the 401(k) plan and the general equity market. Perhaps a disadvantage of these data is that the question on ESPP participation only asks employees if they ever participated in the stock purchase plan. Thus we cannot infer whether employees participates to the full allowed amount and whether they currently participate. Table IV reports that the non-participation rates at four …rms range from 7.7% (in …rm A) to 59.1% (in …rm D). Although these numbers are considerably lower than the average non-participation rates from our …rm-level data, the participation is measured di¤erently here and the …rm selection for survey may be non-random. For example, …rm A, which is also a part of our broad …rm sample, turns out to have the highest participation rate in ESPP among all …rms that we have considered. In fact, the ESPP non-participation using our ESPP participation (survey salary) comes up to be 0% in the year of the survey, which is again consistent with the overestimation of participation using the averages of salary.
The average annual loss per non-participant is $4,660 in …rm A or roughly 5.2% of salary. Over the employee tenure, the amount of losses adds to $18,942. It is lower at $1,510 for …rm D since this …rm has a $5,000 annual limit on participation.
We also calculate the after-tax value loss to employee. Since we know the salary of each individual employee we can obtain their marginal tax rates in the year of the survey (2004/2005) . The tax treatment of ESPP sales is somewhat complicated, with di¤erent amount of tax levied on disqualifying (less than two years since the date of purchase) and qualifying dispositions. In general, however, the e¤ective tax rate goes down if employee holds the stock longer. For our purposes, we are interested in the amount of tax that would be triggered if employee engages in the same-day sale. In this case, the tax treatment is simple as there is no capital gain to consider and all income that employee earns on the ESPP is ordinary income. Calculated in this way, the average annual after-tax value loss is $3,265 in …rm A and $1,213 in …rm D, which is still non-trivial. Finally, in the survey of …rm A there were several additional questions included on the valuation of employee stock options that may be related to …nancial literacy.
Speci…cally, employees were asked for how many shares of stock they would exchange 10 underwater stock options. Amazingly, the survey shows that 5.1% of surveyed employees consider stock options completely worthless and would exchange them for 0 shares of stock. On the other extreme, there are also people who would not exchange their 10 underwater stock options for anything less than 10 shares of stock, with frequent suggested numbers in the range of 11-20 shares of stock. We …nd that overall 15.0% of all surveyed people grossly overvalue stock options.
In Table V , we break down the employee non-participation in ESPP and associated employee losses by employee salary, household wealth, and education. We only focus on …rms A and D since we know the exact terms of the stock purchase plans for these …rms and thus are able to accurately calculate the losses due to non-participation. Panel B of Table V shows that non-participation in ESPP is much more common among the lowpaid employees. For example, in …rm D, 59.5% of employees making less than $50,000
per year fail to participate in ESPP versus 29.4% employees who make over $100,000 in salary. A similar pattern is observed in …rm A, with di¤erences in non-participation rates being statistically di¤erent in two groups (t-stat =10.29). Since highly paid employees can contribute more to the plan and since they tend to have longer tenure at their …rms, the losses per non-participant tend to be larger. For example, employees of …rm A who have salary over $100,000 per year lose approximately $20,570 over their tenure because of non-participation in ESPP.
The low-paid workers are also more likely to incorrectly value the employee stock options. According to the survey in …rm A, only 3.8% of highly compensated employees place no value on underwater stock options, whereas 12.2% of low-paid employees make the same mistake. At the same time, more low-paid employees have tendency to overvalue stock options than the highly paid employees. The incidence of overvaluation and undervaluation are statistically di¤erent between the two groups.
Panels B and C present results sorted by household wealth and employee education level. Generally, a very similar picture emerges with wealthier and more educated employees making fewer …nancial mistakes. They are more likely to enroll in ESPP, and more likely to correctly value the employee stock options.
III. Determinants of Failing to Participate in ESPP
A. Potential Explanations of Non-Participation
In this section, we test di¤erent potential explanations for the wide non-participation in ESPP. We start by estimating the employee out-of-pocket expenses associated with trading the ESPP stock. As we have previously mentioned, most employers tend to pay for the ESPP account maintenance and the brokerage costs associated with purchases of ESPP stock. However, the fees charged for stock sales are typically the responsibility of employee. To estimate these expenses, we assume that employee sells the stock each end of purchase period (e.g., twice a year if the purchase period is 6 months) and assume that a reasonable brokerage fee for one sale transaction of $25.
These assumptions yield an estimated $85 spent in brokerage fees per annum, which is considerably smaller than the after-tax pro…t from ESPP participation of $3,331.
A.2. Liquidity Constraints
We then consider the liquidity constraints of employees since Campbell argues in his (2004) argue that many households do not participate in the general stock market in the U.S. because they are unaware of its existence or attractiveness. They show that more social households show a higher propensity to invest in the stock market.
To proxy for the awareness of the ESPP at the …rm level, we use the number of years since the plan has been adopted, presuming that over time employees had an opportunity to learn about the plan's existence. We also use the value of stock options grants per employee in this …rm. The rationale for this variable is that employees who receive stock options are more likely to be familiar with dealing with the stock in general. Additionally, to capture the employee familiarity with trading stocks and general tendency to study the bene…t plans at the …rm, we use the under-participation in 401(k) and percentage of people with bachelor degree in the state of the …rm's headquarters. At the individual level, we also employ such variables as worker tenure, whether employee ever received stock options, whether employee ever bought the company stock on the open market, whether employee frequently trades other securities, and whether she currently participates in a 401(k) plan.
A related explanation to the low participation is …nancial illiteracy of employees or their perception of such. For example, Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005) we also use employee age and age-squared to capture the adverse e¤ects of cognitive aging on ability to understand terms of bene…t plans.
A.4. Trust and Loyalty
We also test for several behavioral explanations to non-participation. For example, the literature has suggested that trust may be an important element needed for an individual to invest into something (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008)). To proxy for trust at the individual employee level, we rely on the survey questions that ask employees to evaluate whether the company keeps its promises, and whether the company is fair to its employees. Additionally, we match the facility of the country of international employees in our sample to the World Value Survey at the country level. We use responses of individuals from the same country to questions such as "do you trust people you know personally", and "do you trust people you …rst meet."Whenever we identify on the country level, we use only countries that have at least 10 employees in our sample.
Another possibility is that some employees may not like to participate in ESPP through the purchase of company stock (no matter how temporary) because they do not like to be associated with the company. For example, Cohen (2009) shows the importance of loyalty in pension contribution decisions of employees. At the …rm level, we proxy for loyalty using the dummy variable for whether the …rm makes a list of 100 best companies to work for during the year, the number of analysts that follow the stock, the average approval rate of a …rm's CEO by employees, and the average satisfaction of employees with their jobs. Additionally, we use the Her…ndhal index of geographic concentration based on extracted state name counts from annual reports (see Garcia and Norli (2012) ).
Data Archives (ARDA) public data …les to de…ne the general religiosity and the ratio of Catholics to Protestants at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the U.S.
Speci…cally, we match the …rms by the MSA of their headquarters's location and de…ne religiosity as a fraction of also religion adherents in the MSA to the MSA's total population. The ratio of Catholics to Protestants is the ratio of Roman Catholics'
adherents to all Protestants in the MSA. Using the World Value Survey, we also employ country variation in our individual employee data. In each country, we calculate an average ratio of Roman Catholics to all Protestants, Methodists, Muslim, and Hindu, as well as the average frequency with which respondents say they belong to any religious denomination.
A.6. Individual Past Experiences
Finally, we consider a possibility that individual experiences of stock market ‡uc-tuations a¤ect the decision to buy the stock through ESPP. Malmendier and Nagel We test for the in ‡uence of past experiences on the decision to sign up for the plan by using the contemporaneous and the previous three years of stock returns. In the individual level tests, we also employ a measure of weighted past stock returns of the S&P 500 index, created in the same way as in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) , with the exception that we consider only experiences starting from the age of 10, rather than from 0 (since it is somewhat unlikely that an individual would have memory of stock returns at the time when she was 2 years of age). Our results are robust to starting from the age of 0, 5, or 15, however. Additionally, we make use of the survey question that asks individuals how the stock market experiences over the past few years a¤ected their attitude towards incentive-based compensation.
B. Firm-Level Results
The determinants of ESPP participation at the …rm level are presented in Table VI .
In most regressions at the …rm level, we control for such …rm-characteristics as the amount of research and development normalized by …rm's assets, …rm size as proxied by the logarithm of book assets, the growth opportunities measured as the average Tobin's Q, average salary of …rm's employees, the combined expected discount and the dummy variable for whether the plan restricts immediate resale of stock. We also include year and industry-…xed e¤ects (Fama-French 17 industries); the standard errors are clustered at the …rm level.
We …nd that liquidity constraints are important for employee sign-ups to the ESPP.
For example, the participation rates tend to increase with the average employee salary (the coe¢ cient is signi…cant in 13 out of 15 speci…cations). The participation rates are also strongly related to the value obtained by employees from their option exercises.
However, the economic e¤ects of liquidity constraints are modest. A one standard deviation increase in value from option exercises increases the participation rate by only 2.4%, when the average participation is 18.1%.
There is some evidence that awareness of the plan decreases the non-participation.
Speci…cally, as the number of years since plan adoption increases we see higher participation rates, with each additional year increasing participation by approximately 0.5% (column 3). We also see that the education of employees, as proxied by the fraction of population with bachelor degree in the state of …rm's headquarters, is associated with somewhat higher participation rate (column 4). Firms that make larger option grants tend to have higher participation rates, perhaps because their stock programs are more broad-based and employees are more familiar in dealing with stock (column 5). However, it is also possible that option grants capture some unobservable …rm characteristic (e.g., quality of employees).
Evidence suggests that in …rms where employees do not enroll in 401(k) they also do not sign up for the ESPP (column 6). For example, a one standard deviation in under-participation in 401(k) is associated with a 4.9% drop in the ESPP sign-ups.
These results may indicate that employees who are familiar with trading feel more comfortable investing in ESPP, however it is also possible that some other unobservable …rm or employee characteristics drive the results. For example, some …rms may put much less e¤ort in trying to communicate the bene…t plans to their employees.
Somewhat mitigating these concerns, we document in column 7 that our results are preserved if we include …rm-…xed e¤ects instead of industry-…xed e¤ects.
We next examine whether participation in ESPP is determined by employees'attitudes to risk. Speci…cally, we include the di¤erent components of value provided by the plan, such as discount, value of lookback option, and value of reset option. The logic is that the discount provided by the plan represents a certain bene…t, whereas the other two components cannot be negative but can have di¤erent realized values depending on the stock returns. If employees are considerably risk averse, the participation rates should respond more to the discount rate than to the other two components.
In column 8, we see that it is indeed the case. For example, an additional discount of 1% increases participation rate by 0.9%, whereas 1% of lookback value increases participation only by 0.3%. Additionally, there is weak evidence that participation decreases with holdup (by an average of 3.8%). However, this last result is not robust to the inclusion of …rm-…xed e¤ects, perhaps because of very infrequent changes in holdup feature over time. In column 9, we test whether ESPP participation rates are lower in …rms that already force employees to invest in stock through a 401(k) plan by providing a match in a form of company stock. We do …nd a modest e¤ect of a presence of 401(k) with match in stock on ESPP participation.
We also …nd that religious denomination of the …rm's headquarters MSA has some explanatory power for participation rates. For example, higher religiosity and lower ratio of Roman Catholics to Protestant in the MSA are associated with less participation (column 10). These results corroborate …ndings of Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) for the employee stock option grants. In their case, however, the decision to grant stock options is made by the manager rather than employees themselves, implying that the link between religious denominations of employees and option grants is less direct. In our case, employees voluntarily choose whether to buy the stock through ESPP.
Our results also provide support for employee loyalty explanation. Speci…cally, we …nd that being the best 100 employer during the year and having larger analyst coverage is associated with higher participation rates (column 11). The economic magnitude of loyalty is considerable since being a best employer is associated with an approximately 6.7% higher participation rate. We observe similar e¤ects on participation if we use employee CEO approval ratings or employee satisfaction with their jobs (columns 13-14). However, a caveat is that these variables are available only at a single date (2010 year) and may be endogenous. For example, participating in ESPP may make employees to be more satis…ed with their jobs. Additionally, we …nd that …rms that are more geographically concentrated tend to have higher participation rates, perhaps because employees feel more loyal towards local companies. Alternatively, less geographically dispersed …rms can have better communication with employees, so that more employees are informed about potential plan bene…ts.
Finally, in the last two speci…cations we examine whether employees decision to sign up for the plan is determined by their past experiences in the stock market. One of the reasons why it can be the case is that employees extrapolate from the past to the future (Benartzi (2001)). We …nd that when we control for the …rm's Q (market-to-book) ratio, the past returns do not add any explanatory power to the participation rates.
However, if Q is dropped from the speci…cation, the contemporaneous stock returns, as well as stock returns over the previous two years are all signi…cant predictors of participation rates.
C. Individual Level Results
We next turn to the participation in ESPP at the individual level. The results of the logit estimation are presented in Table VII . Overall, we …nd that participation is more common among people who hold college degrees, have been promoted, have longer tenure at the …rm, and report higher level of wealth and salary (column 1).
7
Asian people tend to participate more frequently in ESPP, whereas Native Americans show greater tendency to non-participation, although the latter e¤ect is sometimes non-signi…cant. We also …nd a non-linear e¤ect of age on the decision to sign up for the plan. As people age and become more experienced they are more likely to take advantage of plan bene…ts, however this e¤ect is reversed at a very old age. The inverted U-shape age-skill pattern we …nd in the context of the ESPP participation is similar to results in Korniotis and Kumar (2011) on individual investments in general equity market. Interestingly, although in all four …rms employees are allowed to dispose of the ESPP stock immediately, we …nd that the individual risk-aversion does matter for employee decision to participate in ESPP, with more risk averse people less likely to sign up for the plan.
Our evidence also points to importance of familiarity in dealing with stock. For example, we …nd that having participated in 401(k) plan, having bought company stock on the market, trading other securities and having ever received stock option are all associated with lower non-participation (column 2). In column 3, we test whether people who are likely to make mistakes in valuation of stock options are also more prone to not sign up for the ESPP. We …nd that indeed both groups of employees who grossly overvalue and undervalue underwater stock options are less likely to make use of ESPP. These results underscore the importance of …nancial literacy.
In column 4, we analyze whether the past individual's experiences of market ‡uc-tuations, as measured by the weighted past S&P 500 index stock returns, a¤ect the decision to enroll in ESPP plan. We …nd that a 1% higher annual stock returns over the course of one's life increases the probability of participation in ESPP by 4.4%.
Similarly, individuals who say that market ‡uctuations over the past few years have made them more favorable toward the equity-based compensation, are more likely to participate in ESPP (column 5). We also test whether general tendency to procrastinate, as proxied by the non-participation in the most recent national election, is associated with non-participation in ESPP. Indeed we …nd support for this explanation (column 6), with people voting in national elections having a 3.8% higher likelihood to participate in ESPP.
In Panel B, we explore such explanations to non-participation as the lack of trust, employee disloyalty and religious denominations. Overall, we …nd that people who report to feel loyal to the …rm or have a sense of common purpose participate more in the plan (column 5), however this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. A similar result is observed for employee trust at the individual level, as proxied by the responses to questions of whether company keeps its promises and whether it is fair to its employees. By matching at the country level of employees, we …nd that employees from less trusting countries are more prone to leaving money on the table. Finally, we …nd that employees from countries that practice religions discouraging gambling, speci…cally Muslims, Hindu, Protestants, and Methodists, are more likely to abstain from participation.
IV. Determinants of Failing to Sell the ESPP Stock
Our individual data set also allows us to examine whether employees quickly sell the stock after they buy it through ESPP. A large number of papers argue that employees in the U.S. invest too much into their company stock (see e. bill resulting from longer holding period. Overall, given such a large estimate of the diversi…cation cost to employees, the decision never to sell the stock over employee tenure is probably ine¢ cient. Additionally, we …nd in unreported results that people who report not selling the ESPP stock also report lower pro…t from ESPP, perhaps because for …rm A returns over the previous 3 years were negative.
Here we investigate the determinants of failing to sell the company stock over employee tenure. Since only employees who decided to participate in ESPP in the …rst place, can make a decision whether to keep or sell the stock afterwards, we estimate our model using the Heckman two-stage sample selection method. We use the same dependent variables for the selection equation (ESPP participation), as for the outcome variable (decision not to sell the stock), so that our identi…cation comes from the non-linearity in the Mills ratio term. Table VIII reports our results for the outcome equation, where the dependent variable is equal to one if employee indicates that he or she has never sold the company stock acquired through ESPP over their tenure, otherwise if employee has ever sold the stock the dependent variable is equal to zero.
We …nd that married people, employees with more promotions, and highly paidemployees are all more likely to sell the stock (column 1). Females are signi…cantly more likely to hold the stock, which is consistent with Barber and Odean (2001) results that women tend to trade less. However, there are some peculiar results as well. For example, we …nd that people with college degrees and high household wealth tend to hold the company stock. Also, we …nd that people who classify themselves as more risk-averse do not sell the stock.
Since some people who acquire the stock through ESPP perhaps do not know how to sell it through the broker or are frightened by the complexities of the tax code associated with stock trading, we test whether previous exposure to trading is associated with more dispositions of stock acquired through ESPP. Indeed, we …nd that people who ever exercised employee stock options or who report to trade frequently in the stock market are much more likely to dispose of the ESPP stock (column 2).
Interestingly, participation in 401(k) has no explanatory power for the decision to sell or hold the stock. This result can be because most 401(k) participants due to their passivity never learn how to sell the stock.
We also …nd evidence that …nancial illiteracy, as proxied by over-and undervaluation of underwater stock options, is associated with lower propensity to sell the stock. This is especially interesting since people who place no value on out-of-the money stock options must have low expectations of future stock price, yet they tend to hold the ESPP stock longer. In column 4, we test whether the previous employee experience in the stock market a¤ects the decision to sell the stock. Interestingly, we …nd that individuals who have experienced high returns of the S&P 500 index over the course of their life, tend to sell the stock acquired through ESPP (column 4). Similar result is observed when we use the individual response to how stock market ‡uctuations have a¤ected their attitude toward equity-based compensation, however, the latter e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant.
To proxy for the past experience with a company stock, we also use a percentage of out-of-the-money stock options currently held by employee. We …nd that people who saw their stock options to go underwater, have a signi…cantly higher propensity to sell the stock (column 6). Overall, this evidence may re ‡ect employee learning the hard way the costs of underdiversi…cation. Alternatively, it may indicate that employees extrapolate future stock returns from the past (Benartzi (2001)).
To see how beliefs of stock misvaluation a¤ect the decision to hold the company stock, we also include two variables on valuation of employee stock options. The …rst variable is equal to 1, if employee says she would sell her underwater ESOs for 5-10%
of the strike price, and is zero otherwise. The second variable is con…dence of employee on a scale of 1 to 5 that underwater stock options will ultimately become valuable.
With both variables, we …nd that employees who think that stock will appreciate tend not to dispose of it (columns 7-8).
Table VIII also shows how employee loyalty and trust to the company a¤ect their decisions to sell the stock. Perhaps non-surprisingly, we …nd that employees who are more loyal to the …rm and more trusting tend not to dispose of the stock (columns 9-10). Thus while loyalty and trust may allow employees to make use of the moneymaking opportunity through ESPP, at the same time they may hurt employees by leaving them subject to risk. Finally, column 13 shows that failing to sell stock is more common among employees who are from countries that practice religions that discourage gambling.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we document that a majority of employees at large public …rms do not invest in ESPP even when it guarantees a riskless return on investment of over 36%.
An average employee forfeits approximately 5.70% of salary or $4,627 per annum by not signing up for the ESPP. Our results suggest that non-participation is at least partially attributed to …nancial illiteracy and unfamiliarity in dealing with stocks.
Using individual survey data, we document that non-participating employees earn lower wages, are less-well educated, and are more likely to incorrectly value …nancial securities. Employees who fail to take advantage of riskless investment through ESPP are also less likely to enroll in a 401(k) plan or participate in a general equity market.
Our …ndings suggest that households make mistakes that signi…cantly a¤ect their welfare.
Soulels, Nicholas S., 1999, The response of household consumption to income tax refunds, American Economic Review 89, 947-958.
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2002, Towards an explanation of household portfolio choice heterogeneity: Non…nancial income and participation cost structures, NBER working paper.
Appendix A: The Bias in Estimation of Participation in ESPP Using the Average Salary Data
Let the random variable e P denote the participation rate in the ESPP, i.e. the contribution of an employee divided by the maximum contribution allowed. Let the random variable e S denote salary of an employee. For each …rm, we would like to measure the average participation rate, i.e. E( e P ). However, because we observe only the average employee salary per …rm instead of a set of individual salaries, we are measuring
To see whether we over-or underestimate the true average participation rate in each …rm, we have to sign the di¤erence between the two measures, i.e.,
Multiplying the equation by E( e S), and using the de…nition of covariance we see
Thus if the correlation between the individual employee salary and participation in ESPP plan is positive, we will tend to overestimate the participation rate. The the sample consists of S&P 500, S&P 400 midcap, and NASDAQ 100 …rms for which we were able to obtain data and which have a stock purchase plan open to all employees in the …rm; years since plan adoption is the number of years since the plan was …rst adopted as disclosed in SEC …lings; maximum percent of comp. is the maximum percent of compensation an employee can contribute towards ESPP; annual dollar limit on contributions is the maximum of the dollar limit on participation, as speci…ed by the company, and the average survey wage multiplied by the maximum percent of comp.; discount is the percentage discount at which employee can buy a stock; lookback option is equal to one if the price at which employees can buy the stock is lower of the price at the beginning and the end of the o¤ ering period minus the speci…ed discount; reset option is the option to reset the purchase to the price at the beginning of the previous o¤ering period; lookback (reset) value is the value of the lookback (reset) option as a percentage of purchase price; combined expected discount is the sum of discount, lookback value, and reset value; holdup is equal to 1 if employees are not allowed to dispose of the stock immediately after the purchase, and is 0 otherwise; holdup period is the minimum number of months the employee is required to hold the stock; transaction costs paid by company is equal to 1 if the company pays transaction costs (including brokerage fees) for the stock purchase (but not necessarily for the sale), and is 0 otherwise; withdraw contribution option is equal to 1 if the …rm allows to withdraw contributions during the offering period, and is 0 otherwise; increase (decrease) contribution option is equal to 1 if the …rm allows to increase (decrease) contributions rate during the o¤ering period, and is 0 otherwise; survey salary is the average wage as self-reported by employees on the Glassdoor.com; Compustat salary is equal to the sta¤ expense (from Compustat) normalized by the number of employees; whenever this item is missing, it is set to the median value within industry (de…ned by two-digit SIC code) for that year; option grants/employee is the Black-Scholes value of granted employee stock options, normalized by the number of employees; value from option exercises/employee is the number of options exercised by employees multiplied by the di¤erence in stock price and weighted average exercise price, all normalized by the number of employees; CEO approval by employees is the percentage of employees that approve of the …rm's CEO (Glassdoor.com); employee job satisfaction is the rating by employees of how satis…ed they are with their jobs at the company (Glassdoor.com); 100 best company is the dummy equal to 1 if the …rm is listed in the year as one of the 100 best companies to work for by the Fortune magazine, and is 0 otherwise; 401(k) is equal to 1 if the …rm has 11-K …lings with 401(k) plan during the year; 401(k) with match in stock is equal to 1 if the company match to 401(k) is in employer stock; 401(k) contrib./employee is the total dollar employee contributions to 401(k) per employee; 401(k) match is the percentage match contributed by the company to 401(k); 401(k) match applies to % of salary is the maximum percentage of salary to which company match applies; 401k under-participation as % of salary is the additional percentage of salary that employees would have to contribute to make full use of the employer match. Religiosity is the number of religious adherents in MSA of …rm's headquarters divided by MSA's total population (ARDA). Panel A gives the broad …rm characteristics. Panel B gives the countries in which the work facility is located and the number of employees at this facility; column WVS gives the most recent year in which the World Value Survey was conducted in a particular country. Panel C presents individual employee characteristics. CE of a risky bet is the amount an individual would pay for a bet that wins $1,000 with probability 10%. Wealth is the employee's estimate of household's value of house minus the mortgage, plus value of stocks, mutual funds, and bonds owned, cash, checking accounts, and value of retirements accounts including 401(k). The sample consists of S&P 500, S&P 400 midcap, and NASDAQ 100 …rms which have a stock purchase plan open to all employees. Contributions per employee is the dollar amount contributed by employees to the ESPP during the …scal year divided by the number of employees. Whenever the dollar contributions are missing they are set to the number of shares issued in a plan multiplied by the end-of-year price and one minus the discount. ESPP non-participation (survey salary) is 100% minus the contributions per employee normalized by the minimum of (1) the percent of compensation multiplied by the survey salary, (2) the maximum number of shares that can be purchased multiplied by the beginning-of-year price, and (3) the annual dollar limit; ESPP non-participation (Compustat) is 100% minus the contributions per employee normalized by the maximum percent of comp. multiplied by the Compustat salary ; loss per non-participant is the combined expected discount provided by the ESPP multiplied by the annual dollar limit on contributions; loss per non-participant as % of salary is the loss per non-participant divided by the survey salary; after-tax loss per non-participant is the loss per non-participant minus the expected tax liability, which is calculated as the 28% individual tax rate on pro…t from ESPP trade. The dependent variable is the ESPP participation (survey salary). RD/assets is research and development expenses normalized by the book value of assets; …rm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets; Tobin's Q is the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt normalized by the book value of assets; other variables are de…ned in the headers of Tables I and II . The estimation includes year and industry …xed-e¤ects. T -statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by …rm are listed in parentheses. The numbers below the t-statistics indicate by how much the participation rate increases for a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable. Signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if employee ever participated in ESPP, and is equal to 0 otherwise. The model is estimated by logit with …rm-…xed e¤ects. Trade other securities is equal to 1 if employee answers that he/she frequently buys and sells securities in the market, and is equal to 0 otherwise. Bought company stock on open market is equal to 1 if employee ever bought company stock on the market, and is equal to 0 otherwise. Number of promotions is the number of promotions received over the employee tenure, where 3 or more promotions are coded as 3. Irrational ESO overvaluation is equal to 1 if employee would not exchange 10 underwater stock options for anything less than 10 shares. Irrational ESO undervaluation is equal to 1 if employee would exchange 10 underwater stock options for 0 shares of stock. Weighted past S&P 500 returns are the weighted past stock returns of the S&P 500 index over the individual's life starting from the age of 10, with more recent years carrying larger weights (as in Malmeinder and Nagel (2011)). Past favorable stock market experience is the individual's response on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being "made me more favorable," to "How have the ‡uctuations in the stock market in the past few years a¤ected your attitude towards equity compensation?" Voted in national election is equal to 1 if employee voted in the most recent country election, and is 0 otherwise. Employee loyalty is the sum of how loyal employee feels to the …rm on a scale of 1 to 4 and whether employee feels she shares a common purpose with …rm on a scale of 1 to 4. Employee trust is the sum of whether employee feels company is fair to its employees on a scale of 1 to 4 and whether the company keeps its promises. Trust people you know is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they trust people who they know personally (WVS). Trust people …rst meet is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they trust people who they meet for the …rst time (WVS). Belong to religion is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they belong to a religious denomination (WVS). Belong to religion discouraging gambling is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they belong to Muslims, Hindu, Protestants, or Methodists denomination (WVS). Standard controls in Panel B include female, married, Asian, Black, Native American, BA degree, age, age 2 , log(tenure), number of promotions, log(salary), log(wealth), and employee risk aversion.
(1) (-3.13) -0.04 (-1.78) -0.11 (-3.69) -0.06 (-3.12 (continued)
(8) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if employee participated in ESPP but never sold the stock, and is equal to 0 if employee participated in ESPP and have sold the stock sometime in the past. The model is estimated by two-stage Heckman selection model with …rm-…xed e¤ects. The selection equation (whether employee chooses to participate) uses the same dependent variables as the outcome equation (whether employee does not sell the stock). Trade other securities is equal to 1 if employee answers that he/she frequently buys and sells securities in the market, and is equal to 0 otherwise. Bought company stock on open market is equal to 1 if employee has ever bought company stock on the market, and is equal to 0 otherwise. Number of promotions is the number of promotions received over the employee tenure, where 3 or more promotions are coded as 3. Employee loyalty is the sum of how loyal employee feels to the …rm on a scale of 1 to 4 and whether employee feels she shares a common purpose with …rm on a scale of 1 to 4. Employee trust is the sum of whether employee feels company is fair to its employees on a scale of 1 to 4 and whether the company keeps its promises. Trust people you know is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they trust people who they know personally (WVS). Trust people …rst meet is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they trust people who they meet for the …rst time (WVS). Belong to religion is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they belong to a religious denomination (WVS). Belong to religion discouraging gambling is the average frequency respondents of a particular country say they belong to Muslims, Hindu, Protestants, or Methodists denomination (WVS). Irrational ESO overvaluation is equal to 1 if employee would not exchange 10 underwater stock options for anything less than 10 shares. Irrational ESO undervaluation is equal to 1 if employee would exchange 10 underwater stock options for 0 shares of stock. Weighted past S&P 500 returns are the weighted past stock returns of the S&P 500 index over the individual's life starting from the age of 10, with more recent years carrying larger weights (as in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) ). Past favorable stock market experience is the individual's response on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being "made me more favorable,"to "How have the ‡uctuations in the stock market in the past few years a¤ected your attitude towards equity compensation?"Would sell underwater ESOs is equal to 1 if employee says she would sell underwater stock options for 5-10% of stock price, and is 0 otherwise. Stock is undervalued is whether employee believes underwater stock options will become valuable on a scale of 1 to 5. Percent of underwater stock options is the percentage of currently held stock options that are out-of-the-money. Standard controls in Panel B include female, married, Asian, Black, Native American, BA degree, age, age 2 , log(tenure), number of promotions, log(salary), log(wealth), and employee risk aversion.
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